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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, both the state and federal court systems have had
minimal experience in domestic law cases regarding the specific
issues of parental rights and parental st46ding. In fact, "only four
opinions of the United States Supreme Court have dealt directly
with the constitutional claims of unwed fathers against state action
terminating their relationships with their children."' "Because the
father owed no legal duty to his illegitimate child at common law,
it naturally followed that he should have no rights concerning the
child. ' 2 Because approximately one-third of the births in this coun-
try are the result of non-legalized relationships, 3 there has been a
judicial trend to broaden the parental rights of unwed fathers and
to more closely scrutinize the statutory disabilities under which
unwed fathers have traditionally been placed regarding their chil-
dren.4 Furthermore, although domestic law has traditionally fo-
cused more on parents' legal rights than on parents' legal duties,
1. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Ro-
binson, 45 Ono ST. L.J. 313, 319 (1984). The cases are Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Lehr v.
Robinson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
2. Note, The Unwed Father's Parental Rights and Obligations After S.P.B.: A Retreat in
Constitutional Protection, 60 DEN. L.J. 659, 663. According to the doctrine of Nullius Filius, the
illegitimate child was characterized as no man's son.
3. Id. at 669.
4. Id. at 663 n.37.
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such legal rights have recently become more dependent upon the
performance of the respective legal duty.5
The United States Supreme Court decisions broadening the rights
of unwed fathers, like those broadening the rights of illegitimate
children, have been based on the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment. 6 Statutes which restrict such rights without a coun-
tervailing compelling state interest have been found unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the equal protection clause and/or the due
process clause.
The United States Supreme Court first confronted the issue of
the custody rights of a putative father 7 in the case of Stanley v.
IllinoiS.8 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently had
the opportunity to hear the case of McGuire v. Farley,9 an appeal
of a domestic law case in which the main issue was whether a
putative father of an illegitimate child had standing to bring an
action for paternity and concurrent visitation rights.
Prior to the Stanley decision in 1972, courts had applied a pre-
sumption in favor of maternal custody, especially in cases involving
young children and infants. This presumption, known as the "tender
years presumption," and the general rule favoring maternal custody
have more recently been somewhat abrogated due to the ever-
changing view of traditional sex roles.' 0 Although the "tender years
presumption" has not been rejected by either case law or statute,"
courts now look at the child's sex, age, and preference, as well as
the fitness of the respective parents in determining what is in the
child's best interest. This "best interest standard" is applied in the
decision-making process involved in granting visitation rights to
5. Buchanan, supra note I, at 319-20.
6. Note, supra note 2, at 663.
7. Comment, Equal Protection and the Putative Father: An Analysis of Purham v. Huges
and Caban v. Mohammed, 34 Sw. L.J. 717, 718 (1981).
8. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
9. McGuire v. Farley, 370 S.E.2d 136 (W. Va. 1988).
10. Note, The Best Interests Of The Child In Custody Controversies Between Natural Parents:
Interpretations and Trends, 18 WAsHBuRN L.J. 482, 489 (1979).
11. Note, Visitation Rights: Providing Adequate Protection for the Noncustodial Parent, 3
CARDozo L. REv. 431, 432 (1982). See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1986).
[Vol. 91
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noncustodial parents. 12 Judicial cognizance of visitation rights for
unwed fathers has continually evolved as the parental role of the
unwed father has expanded. 13 When an unmarried father takes an
active interest in his child's or children's welfare and paternity is
not an issue, the United States Constitution does not allow the
state to actively discriminate against the unmarried father. 4 The
unwed father's interest in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his children is both cognizable and substantial.
Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois,
holding that the interest of the father of an illegitimate child in retaining custody
of his child is cognizable and substantial, and that to deprive him of the child's
custody without a hearing as to his fitness as a parent was a denial of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the rights of
the unwed father have come under renewed scrutiny by the courts. The result
has been to broaden and liberalize the unwed father's rights through either
ignoring or judicially amending or even holding unconstitutional statutes which
deny or restrict his rights.' 5
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
McGuire v. Farley began when putative father McGuire filed
a petition in circuit court alleging his paternity of a child born out
of wedlock and seeking visitation rights with the child. The natural
mother of the child, Farley, initially denied McGuire's paternity
(although she later admitted to the appellant's paternity) and con-
tended that the father lacked standing to maintain a paternity ac-
tion under chapter 48A, article 6, section 1 of the West Virginia
Code (hereinafter W. Va. Code). 1 6 The family law master accepted
12. Note, supra note 11, at 433.
13. Martin, Legal Rights of the Unwed Father, 102 Mn,. L. REv. 77 (1983).
14. Id. at 79.
15. Pierce v. Yerkovich, 80 Misc. 2d 613, 614-15, 363 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (1974).
16. W. VA. CODE § 48A-6-1 (1986), which states:
A civil action to establish the paternity of a child and to obtain an order of support for
the child may be instituted, by verified complaint, in the circuit court of the county where
the plaintiff, the defendant or the child resides. Such action may be brought by any of
the following persons:
(1) An unmarried woman with physical or legal custody of a child to whom she gave
birth;
(2) A married woman with physical or legal custody of a child to whom she gave birth,
if the complaint alleges that:
1989]
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the mother's position, and the circuit court concurred, holding that
the cited statutory provision 17 "[d]oes not permit a non-custodial
father of an infant to bring a paternity action.' ' 8
The father appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, and argued "that denying him the right to maintain a
paternity action violate[d] his constitutional right to equal protec-
tion." 19 The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the circuit court, and held that "[tihe circuit court has jurisdiction
to entertain appellant's petition for visitation rights, notwithstand-
ing that determining visitation rights also implies a determination
of paternity.' '20
III. PRIOR LAW
In reaching its decision in McGuire, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals relied directly on its prior decision in J.M.S. v.
H.A. ,21 which in turn was predicated on the United States Supreme
Court holding in Stanley v. Illinois.22 Because "the considerations
and interests involved in granting visitation rights are similar to
those involved in determining custody," z Stanley represents the
"starting point in examining constitutional cases [and issues] which
focus on the rights of unwed fathers." 24
(A) Such married woman lived separate and apart from her husband for a period of one
year or more immediately preceding the birth of the child;
(B) Such married woman did not cohabit with her husband at any time during such
separation and that such separation has continued without interruption; and
(C) The defendant, rather than her husband, is the father of the child.
(3) Any person, including the state of West Virginia or the department of human services,
who is not the mother of the child, but who has physical or legal custody of such child;
(4) The guardian or committee of such child;
(5) The next friend of such child when the child is a minor; or
(6) By such child in his own right at any time after the child's eighteenth birthday but
prior to the child's twenty-first birthday.
17. Id.
18. McGuire, 370 S.E.2d at 137.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. J.M.S. v. H.A., 161 W. Va. 433, 242 S.E.2d 696 (1978).
22. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
23. Note, supra note 11.
24. Martin, supra note 13, at 77.
[Vol. 91
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The facts of Stanley25 show that Stanley lived intermittently for
eighteen years with a female companion, and during that time the
two became parents of three children. Upon the death of Stanley's
female companion, Stanley lost custody of the three children. Fol-
lowing a dependency proceeding initiated by the state of Illinois,
Stanley's children were declared wards of the state and were placed
with court-appointed guardians. Pursuant to Illinois law, the chil-
dren of an unwed father automatically became wards of the state
upon the unwed mother's death.
Stanley appealed, claiming that he had never been shown to be an unfit parent
and that since married fathers and unwed mothers could not be deprived of
their children without such a showing, he had been deprived of the equal pro-
tection of the laws guaranteed him by the fourteenth amendment.
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the equal protection claim,
holding that Stanley lacked standing to raise the argument of pa-
rental fitness.27 Stanley then pressed his equal protection claim to
the United States Supreme Court.28
The central question examined by the Supreme Court in Stanley
was posed as follows: "Is a presumption that distinguishes and
burdens all unwed fathers constitutionally repugnant?"29 The court
answered this question in the affirmative and "unequivocally es-
tablished that a father of an illegitimate child must receive the same
treatment and consideration as that received by any parent with
respect to the termination of his parental rights."3 0
In deciding the Stanley case, the Supreme Court was faced with
an Illinois dependency statute3' that empowered state officials to
circumvent neglect proceedings on the theory that an unwed father
is not a "parent" whose existing relationship with his children must
be considered. 32 The state spoke of "the generic disinterest of pu-
25. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
26. Id.
27. In re Stanley, 45 Ill.2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970), cert. denied, Stanley v. Illinois, 400
U.S. 1020 (1971), rev'd, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
28. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
29. Id. at 649.
30. J.M.S., 161 W. Va. at 435, 242 S.E.2d at 697.
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-14 (1965).
32. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649, 650.
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tative fathers in their children" and opined that "[iun most in-
stances the natural father is a stranger to his children. ' 33 The court
struck down the Illinois statute under which an unwed father was
not included in the statutory definition of "parent;" the statute,
in effect, conclusively presumed the unwed father to be neglectful
and unqualified to raise his children. 4 The state of Illinois based
its position in part on this presumption and postulated that "most
unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents." '35
Although Stanley was technically a custody case, the implica-
tions for application to visitation rights controversies are readily
apparent. "The private interest here, that of a man in the children
he has sired. . . undeniably warrants deference and, absent a pow-
erful countervailing interest, protection.''36
The Supreme Court has often commented on the importance
of family and has held that the rights to conceive and to raise
one's children are essential, 37 that these are basic civil rights of
man, 8 and that the integrity of the family unit finds protection in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 39 This rec-
ognized liberty embodied in the fourteenth amendment is not "de-
fined with exactness," but "without doubt, it denotes . . . the
right of the individual to . . . establish a home and bring up chil-
dren."' 40 The Supreme Court has "recognized on numerous occa-
sions that the relationship between parent and child is
constitutionally protected; " 4 1 therefore, heightened scrutiny should
be applied to "legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriages and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race." ' 42 "Nor has the law refused
33. Id. at 654 n.6.
34. Case comment, Domestic Relations Parental Rights of the Putative Father: Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Considered, 14 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 259 (1984).
35. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 654.
36. Id. at 651.
37. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
38. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
39. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
40. Id.
41. Quifloin v, Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
42. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
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to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage
ceremony." ' 43 It has been determined that illegitimate children are
not "nonpersons; '" 44 therefore, it should logically follow that the
parents of illegitimate children should not be considered nonper-
sons.
The fourteenth amendment clearly mandates that no state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws, ' 45 and the equal protection clause necessarily limits the
authority of a state to draw legal versus biological lines as it sees
fit. "To say that the test of equal protection should be the 'legal'
rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue.''46 The
real issue is whether a legislative body can transform an illegitimate
child into a nonperson; obviously it cannot. If a legislature cannot
transform an illegitimate child into a nonperson, then the legislative
body should not be able to transform the unwed father of the
illegitimate child into a similar nonperson.
"What is the state interest in separating children from fathers
without a hearing designed to determine whether the father is unfit
in a particular disputed case?" 47 The Supreme Court decision in
Stanley underscored the position that an unwed father's interest in
his children, including visitation therewith, is both appreciable and
material. The state's interest in caring for an unwed father's chil-
dren is minimal if the unwed father is shown to be a fit father. 48
Therefore, it follows that denying a hearing to unwed fathers while
granting a hearing to other parents is "inescapably contrary to the
equal protection clause. "49 Procedure by factless presumption would
always be less expensive and administratively or judicially more
simplistic than an individualized determination. However, should
the procedure foreclose the factually determinative issues of com-
43. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. The court makes reference to Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968), which held unconstitutional a state statute that denied natural but illegitimate children a wrong-
ful death action for the death of the mother.
44. Levy, 391 U.S. at 70.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
46. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968).
47. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
48. Id. at 658.
49. Id.
1989]
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petence and care, such procedure "needlessly risks running rough-
shod over the important interests of both parent and child." 50
Subsequent to the 1972 United States Supreme Court decision
in Stanley v. Illinois, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
heard two precedent-setting domestic cases involving custody dis-
putes. In Hammack v. Wise,5 a 1975 case, the court noted that
[i]t has become firmly established in this jurisdiction that a parent has a natural
right to the custody of his or her infant child and that he or she cannot be
deprived of that right unless upon cogent and convincing proof of misconduct,
neglect, immorality, abandonment or other dereliction of duty reflecting un-
fitness as a parent.52
"The right of a parent to have the custody of his or her child is
founded on natural law and, while not absolute, such right will
not be taken away unless the parent has committed an act or is
guilty of an omission which proves his or her unfitness." '53 Con-
sequently, "a father of an illegitimate child must receive the same
treatment and consideration as that received by any parent with
respect to the termination of his parental rights." 54
The Supreme Court of Appeals took a further step in the 1976
case of Adams v. Bowens.5 5 The sole issue before the court in
Adams was whether a circuit court has jurisdiction to determine
custody of minor children. The court concluded that "the physical
presence of the child [and all other contending parties before the
50. Id. at 656, 657.
51. Hammack v. Wise, 158 W. Va. 343, 211 S.E.2d 118 (1975).
52. Id. at 347, 211 S.E.2d at 121. This same position was "forcefully expressed" in the
syllabus of State ex rel. Kiger v. Hancock, 153 W. Va. 404, 168 S.E.2d 798 (1969), as follows:
A parent has the natural right to the custody of his or her infant child and, unless the
parent is an unfit person because of misconduct, neglect, immorality, abandonment, or
other dereliction of duty, or has waived such right, or by agreement or otherwise has
permanently transferred, relinquished or surrendered such custody, the right of the parent
to the custody of his or her infant child will be recognized and enforced by the courts.
Id.
53. Hammack, 158 W. Va. at 348, 211 S.E.2d at 121. See also State ex. rel. Action v. Flowers,
154 W. Va. 209, 174 S.E.2d 742 (1970); Holstein v. Holstein, 152 W. Va. 119 (1968); Whiteman
v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960); Hoy v. Dooley, 144 W. Va. 64, 105 S.E.2d
877 (1958).
54. Hammack, 158 W. Va. at 346, 211 S.E.2d at 120-21 (citing J.M.S., 161 W. Va. at 435,
242 S.E.2d at 697, noting Stanley, 405 U.S. 645).
55. Adams v. Bowens, 159 W. Va. 882, 230 S.E.2d 481 (1976).
[Vol. 91
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 15
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/15
McGUIRE v. FARLEY
court] together with jurisdiction over the parties is a sufficient basis
to permit a court to determine and award custody of a minor
child."- 6
Following the Adams decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals in 1978 held in J.M.S. that "[a] circuit court has ju-
risdiction to award or deny visitation rights to a father of an il-
legitimate child." '5 7 The specific issue decided in J.M.S., the right
of visitation of one's illegitimate offspring, was "one of first im-
pression in [the] jurisdiction."5 8 The court made reference to the
legislative recognition of the right of a parent to the custody of
his or her child 9 as provided in the state statutes,6° but made no
reference to the procedural postures necessary in the establishment
of paternity. The court recognized in J.M.S. that Hammack and
Adams dealt with custody rather than visitation, yet relied on both
Hammack and Adams in concluding that: "if a court has juris-
diction to grant custody, a fortiori, it certainly possesses jurisdic-
tion to grant visitation rights in a proper case."'6
Rather than review and reinterpret the existing custody statutes
(as the court later did in McGuire), the court in J.M.S. examined
and relied on pertinent case law from other jurisdictions. The ex-
amination revealed "support for the right of the father of an il-
legitimate child to visit such child." '62
In one such case, R. v. F., 6 a 1971 New Jersey case, two per-
tinent questions were raised: 1) whether the court had jurisdiction
to grant visitation rights not incidental to an order of support, and
2) whether the father of a child born out of wedlock has any right
to visitation without the express or implied consent of the mother.6 4
56. Id. at 887, 230 S.E.2d at 484, 485. Jurisdiction of the court is derived from W. VA.
CONST. art. viii, § 6.
57. J.M.S., syllabus of the court, 161 W. Va. at 433, 242 S.E.2d at 696.
58. Id. at 434, 435, 242 S.E.2d at 697.
59. Id. at 435, 242 S.E.2d at 697.
60. W. VA. CODE § 44-10-7 (1972). Management of Ward's Estate; maintenance, education,
custody; duration of guardianship; settlement.
61. J.M.S., 161 W. Va. at 435, 242 S.E.2d at 697.
62. Id.
63. R. v. F., 113 N.J. Super. 396, 273 A.2d 808 (1971).
64. Id. at 399, 273 A.2d at 809.
1989]
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The court concluded that it "must consider visitation by the father
to be the natural right of each child ' 65 and that "visitation rights
may properly be granted to the father if it is determined that such
visitation would be in the best interest of the child." '66
At the time of the R. v. F. decision, the father of an illegitimate
child in the state of New Jersey was charged by statute with the
duty to support the child.67 Either parent could enforce such ob-
ligations.68 The court in R. v. F. pointed out that a father is able
to obtain custody of an illegitimate child in juvenile and domestic
relations court. 69 Therefore, the court concluded that "[i]f visita-
tion can be granted to a father in [the juvenile and domestic re-
lations] court . . .[then no reason exists] to restrict the availability
of that right to support cases. . . . If [the] court can grant tem-
porary custody, a fortiori, it can grant visitation in the proper
case."
70
The court stated, however, that in order to enforce the afore-
mentioned statutory obligations, "it is necessary to show that the
putative father is actually the child's natural father." ' 71 The statute
in question 72 infringed upon both the right of a child to see his or
her father and the right of a father to visit his child. Consequently,
the court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it con-
65. Id. at 402, 273 A.2d at 811.
66. Id. at 410, 273 A.2d at 816.
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:16-2 (West 1976).
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:16-3 (West 1976).
69. R. v. F., 113 N.J. Super. at 401, 273 A.2d at 811 (citing In re Guardianship of C, 98
N.J. Super 474, 237 A.2d 652 (1967)).
70. Id. at 402, 273 A.2d at 811.
71. Id. at 408, 273 A.2d at 814.
72. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:16-1 (West 1976), which stated:
The mother of an illegitimate child, whether married or single, shall have the exclusive
right to its custody and control and the putative father of such child shall have no right
of custody, control or access to such child without the mother's consent. If however, it
is proved that the mother is unfit to have the custody of such child, the Superior Court
or any other court which may have jurisdiction in the premises may make any order
touching the custody or control of such child which might heretofore have been made.
This section is intended to be declaratory of the existing law upon this subject and it
shall, under no circumstances, be construed as an implication that the rights of such a
mother have hitherto been less than as herein above defined.
[Vol. 91
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stituted a violation of the protection offered by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3
A second case relied upon by the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals in J.M.S. was the 1974 New York case of Pierce v.
Yerkovich.7 4 In 1971, "under New York law the putative father
[had] no parental rights with respect to a child born out of
wedlock."7 5 However, in the 1972 case of Doe v. Department of
Social Services, 6 a New York court nonetheless held that "in view
of Stanley, there must now be read into [the] statute77 that the
mother's exclusive or sole consent suffices only where there has
been no formal or unequivocal acknowledgement or recognition of
paternity by the father."7 8 Even so, at the time of Pierce, parental
rights respective to the father had not been specifically established.
The Pierce court, which relied on the 1973 Connecticut case of
Forestiere v. Doyle7 9 averred that in light of Stanley, "there can
no longer be any question but that the father of an out of wedlock
child has standing to be heard on the issue of visitation rights." 80
Visitation decisions should turn on what is in "the best interests
of the child,''81 and to deprive an unwed father of his interest in
an illegitimate child without a hearing as to his parental fitness
constitutes a breach of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 2
Consequently, the notion in Pierce that the custodial parent
should have the sole authority to determine what is in the best
interest of the child, including whether the noncustodial parent
should or should not be permitted association, was summarily re-
jected.8 3
73. R. v. F., 113 N.J. Super. at 410, 273 A.2d at 816.
74. Pierce, 80 Misc. 2d at 613, 363 N.Y.S.2d 403.
75. Doe v. Roe, 37 A.D.2d 433, 436, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (1971).
76. Doe v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 71 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1972).
77. N.Y. Dom. REL. § 111(3), which provided that only the mother's consent was necessary
for the adoption of a child born out of wedlock.
78. Doe v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 71 Misc. 2d at 671, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
79. Forestiere v. Doyle, 30 Conn. Supp. 284, 310 A.2d 607 (1973).
80. Pierce, 80 Misc. 2d at 615, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
81. Id. at 620, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
82. Id. at 614, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
83. Id. at 623, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
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IV. TaE COURT'S ANALYSIS
It becomes apparent from the above discussion of prior law
that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in its analysis
and decision in the instant case, was charged with following the
principles set forth in the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Stanley. Accordingly, the court began its analysis by referring
to Stanley, noting that the United States Supreme Court "recog-
nized the father's interest in retaining custody of his children as
a substantial right," while holding "that the termination of [such]
right without a hearing violated the due process clause of the Con-
stitution. ' 84 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals also de-
ferred to the United States Supreme Court's finding that a "state's
failure to afford the father a hearing due to his unwed status, while
granting other parents a hearing, violated the equal protection
clause."8 -
The McGuire court noted that in J.M.S. it had held that the
circuit court had "jurisdiction to award visitation rights to the fa-
ther of illegitimate children. ' 8 6 In reaching its decision in J.M.S.,
the court had relied on the line of cases flowing from the Stanley
decision 7 and the general jurisdictional power and authority con-
ferred upon the state circuit courts by the West Virginia Consti-
tution. 8 It was important to the court's analysis in McGuire that
it apply the principle articulated in J.M.S. that "[t]o deprive a
parent of visitation rights without a hearing would constitute a
denial of the due process and equal protection under our state and
federal constitutions. "89
The McGuire court held that "the circuit court has jurisdiction
to entertain petitions for visitation rights, including the necessary
84. McGuire, 370 S.E.2d at 137.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Primarily Hammack, Adams, R. v. F. and Pierce, discussed under section III, Prior Law.
88. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6. Circuit court; jurisdiction, authority, and power. "Circuit
courts shall have original and general jurisdiction of all civil cases . . . all matters of . . . the
appointment and qualification of . . . guardians . . . shall be vested exclusively in circuit courts
or their officers . . . ." Id.
89. J.M.S., 161 W. Va. at 436, 242 S.E.2d at 697.
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determination of paternity.' '90 The court concluded, quite properly,
that any decision other than reversing the circuit court in the
McGuire case would have "eviscerated" the decision in J.M.S. The
court said that otherwise the putative father "would have a dis-
embodied right to visit his child that he can never enjoy because
he cannot establish himself as the father."
91
However, it is important to note that the court limited its hold-
ing in the McGuire decision. It was not the court's intention to
permit any man to "initiate a paternity action for any child," ' 92
nor was it the court's intention to encourage third parties to initiate
a paternity action. 93 The holding was limited to factual situations
"where the child has no other legal or determined father." ' 94
The court then turned its attention to the existing statute95 which
"denies standing to the father of an illegitimate child to establish
paternity. ' 96 Based upon prior law, the court held that the statute
was unconstitutional to the extent that it denied standing to the
putative father. Rather than striking the otherwise constitutional
provisions of the statute, the court applied the doctrine of the least
intrusive remedy. 97 The application of the doctrine98 allowed the
court to read the statute "to include the [putative father] as a
person entitled to maintain a paternity action" 99 and to exercise
any corollary rights. The court relied upon its application of the
least intrusive remedy doctrine in Anderson's Paving, Inc. v.
Hayes00 and Weaver v. Shaffer,10 1 and said, "Where a statute serves
an urgent and necessary public purpose but is technically deficient
90. McGuire, 370 S.E.2d at 138.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. W. VA. CODE § 48A-6-1 (1986). (Action for establishment of paternity.)
96. McGuire, 370 S.E.2d at 138.
97. Id.
98. The remedy may be only so much as is required to correct the specification. The remedy
may go beyond this only when there is a record of past constitutional violations and violations of
past court orders. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 1983).
99. McGuire, 370 S.E.2d at 138.
100. Anderson's Paving, Inc. v. Hayes, 295 S.E.2d 805 (1982).
101. Weaver v. Shaffer, 290 S.E.2d 244 (1980).
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for constitutional reasons, this Court will apply the doctrine of the
least intrusive remedy and give the statute, wherever possible, an
interpretation which will cure its defect and save it from total in-
validation." 102
V. COMPARATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
To the extent the existing West Virginia statute' 3 is defective,
it was properly reinterpreted in McGuire. It would appear that the
application of the least intrusive remedy doctrine not only allowed
the court to grant standing to a putative father (while precluding
third party standing), but it also permitted the state legislature to
deal with statutory amendment in the most efficient manner. The
Legislature must merely rectify the deficiency rather than redraft
the entire statute. The repair of W. Va. Code § 48A-6-1 can be
accomplished relatively easily by merely joining the "putative,"
"presumed," or "alleged" father to the already delineated listing
of parties who may bring a paternity action. However, the statutory
remedy remains a legislative function.
Statutory frameworks exist in other states which may serve as
models for revision of West Virginia domestic law. For example,
the state of California, which has adopted the Uniform Parentage
Act, 1 4 provides that "a man presumed to be the child's father...
may bring an action. . . for the purpose of declaring the existence
of the father and child relationship . . . . "105 However, the pre-
sumption of fatherhood is tied to a marriage or an attempt at
marriage or to the conclusory evidence of a blood test. 0 6 If the
102. Anderson's Paving, 295 S.E.2d at 807.
103. W. VA. CODE § 48A-6-1 (1986).
104. The Uniform Parentage Act, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, provided a framework for statutory revision regarding equal treatment of
legitimate and illegitimate children. The Uniform Parentage Act, the revised Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, and the Revised Uniform
Adoption Act were all cornerstones of the comprehensive Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. For
further information on the Uniform Parentage Act, see Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8
Fm. L. Q. 1 (Spring 1974), and for further information regarding the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, see the Desk Guide to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, published by the editors of The
Family Law Reporter.
105. CAL. Crv. CODE § 7006(a)(1) (Deering 1988).
106. CAL. EviD. CODE § 621 (Deering 1988).
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child has no presumed father under the marriage or attempted mar-
riage criteria, the action may be brought by "a man alleged or
alleging himself to be the father .... "107
Massachusetts domestic relations statutes provide that
"[c]omplaints . . . to establish paternity, support, visitation or
custody of a child may be commenced by . . . a person presumed
to be or alleging himself to be the father . "-,0. Like Califor-
nia, Massachusetts links presumption of fatherhood to marriage or
an attempt at marriage. Furthermore, the presumption of paternity
is met when, with consent, the putative father "is named as the
child's father on the birth certificate .. "..",,09 It is interesting to
note that the McGuire decision indicates that because the child
carries the putative father's name, "it is likely that the child's birth
certificate lists [the putative father] as the father, which according
to [statute]"0 is only to be done with the written consent of the
mother and father."''
Under a New York statute, "proceedings to establish the pa-
ternity of the child . . may be commenced . . by a person
alleging to be the father .... 112
This sampling of state statutes indicates that the putative father
has standing to bring a paternity action when he can make the
minimal showing that he is the "presumed" or "alleged" father.
Of course, once the action is commenced, the respondent mother
can always rebut the presumption. Factual determinations will ul-
timately decide the issue. Therefore, little else is needed in the stat-
utory pre-action "putative" criteria.
VI. CONCLUSION
"Certainly, in light of Stanley v. Illinois, there can no longer
be any question but that the father of an out of wedlock child has
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006(c) (Deering 1988).
108. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 5(a) (Law. Co-op. 1988).
109. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 209C, § 6(a)(6) (Law. Co-op. 1988).
110. W. VA. CODE § 16-5-12(e) (1986).
111. McGuire, 370 S.E.2d at 137 n.2.
112. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 522 (McKinney 1988).
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standing to be heard on the issue of visitation rights,"" 3 and "to
deprive a parent of visitation rights without a hearing would con-
stitute a denial of due process and equal protection under our state
and federal constitutions." 1" 4 Yet, the putative father's right to be
heard is obviously dependent upon the establishment of paternity.
Other states have begun to provide for standing of the putative
father to bring paternity and related proceedings and have estab-
lished the criteria for determining which, if any, putative father is
permitted to bring the paternity action. Recognizing that "[e]qual
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws,""' 5
it becomes clear that the current West Virginia paternity statute" 6
will also have to be amended to permit the putative father to bring
a paternity action.
A father's rights to custody have already been identified by the
West Virginia Legislature in a broad sense in other statutory pro-
visions. For example, W. Va. Code § 44-10-7, which is entitled
"Management of ward's estate; maintenance, education and cus-
tody; duration of guardianship; settlement," provides in part that
"the father or mother of any minor child or children shall be en-
titled to the custody of the person of such child or children.""' 7
Furthermore, although the jurisdictional authority of a circuit court
to order custody and visitation rights is not specifically granted by
state statute, the West Virginia Constitution 8 provides circuit courts
with the power and authority to handle such cases." 9 Even so, the
courts' inherent power has been usurped by the present defective
statutory provision because the putative father may not initiate pa-
ternity proceedings.
The McGuire court has interpreted the existing paternity statute
in a manner that grants the putative father of an illegitimate child
the opportunity to be heard regarding his paternal rights. This in-
113. Pierce, 80 Misc. 2d at 615, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
114. J.M.S., 61 W. Va. at 436, 242 S.E.2d at 698.
115. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
116. W. VA. CODE § 48A-6-1 (1986).
117. W. VA. CODE § 44-10-7 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
118. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
119. McGuire, 370 S.E.2d at 138.
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terpretation is consistent with the fourteenth amendment right to
equal protection and due process. However, the trial court must
determine the putative father's rights respective to the best interests
of the child. For example, a court in determining a father's right
to visitation of a child, legitimate or illegitimate, is charged with
giving paramount consideration to the welfare of the child in-
volved. 20 This position represents the so called "polar-star" prin-
ciple: "[In a contest involving the custody of an infant [or child]
the welfare of the child is of paramount and controlling importance
and is the polar star by which the discretion of the court will be
guided."'' This principle, although not always titled as such, has
been applied in West Virginia since 1876.122
A proper application of the "polar-star" principle is contingent
upon all interested parties, including the father, being before the
court. One might question how the best interests of the child could
adequately be determined should the father lack standing to be a
party to such a proceeding. "The fundamental prerequisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard,' ' 2  and in some
cases the presence of the father could also be a fundamental pre-
requisite to the child's best interest.
The holding in the McGuire case is limited to circumstances
"where the child has no other legal or determined father.' ' 24 Or-
dinarily, a "determined father" is identified 1) in a judicial pro-
ceeding involving medical evidence, oral testimony, and/or written
depositions or 2) "when both parents agree and identify the father
in affidavits.' ' 25 Unfortunately, McGuire offers no additional as-
sistance by creating criteria to establish which, if any, putative fa-
ther may bring a paternity action under the reinterpreted statute.
The McGuire case, in light of the thin history of domestic re-
lations case law in West Virginia, is significant in that it addresses
120. Id.
121. State ex. rel. Harmon v. Utterback, 144 W. Va. 419, 428, 108 S.E.2d 521, 527 (1959).
122. Rust v. Vanvacter, 9 W. Va. 600 (1876).
123. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
124. McGuire, 370 S.E.2d at 138.
125. Id.
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both equal protection and due process to be afforded the putative
father. The case clearly stands for the proposition that "[w]hen
an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the respon-
sibilities of parenthood by com[ing] forward to participate in the
rearing of his child, his interest in personal contact with his child
acquires substantial protection under the due process clause.'
'1 26
David E. Thompson
126. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
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